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Most people in terested  in  C anadian  m ilitary history know ab o u t the elite first Special 
Service Battalion, form ed in  Ju ly  1942 as the 
C anad ian  elem ent of the largely Am erican F irst 
Special Service Force.1 Few, however, have ever 
heard  of Viking Force, C anada’s first a ttem p t a t 
creating an  elite Com m ando un it in  the Second 
World War. Viking Force does not appear in  any 
C anadian Army Order of Battle, and  did not even 
la s t long enough for its m em bers to p u t on the 
u n i t ’s h o rn ed -h e lm et sh o u ld er p a tch , yet it 
played an  im portan t role in  the sad  story  of the 
Dieppe fiasco. Acknow ledgm ent of th a t  role is 
long overdue.
The creation of the Vikings w as a  response  
to the  political-m ilitary dilem m as facing the 
B ritish  an d  C anad ian  governm ents after the 
expulsion of Allied forces from the  con tinen t of 
E u ro p e  in  J u n e  1 9 4 0 . T he  w e a k e n e d  
C o m m o n w e a lth  fo rces  h a d  few m e a n s  of 
a ttack ing  the G erm ans directly, except for the 
prim itive and  largely ineffectual ra ids by RAF 
Bom ber Com m and on the G erm an heartland .
In this situation of strategic near-im potence, 
the British government could do little in the short 
term  beyond au thorizing  sm all-scale ra id s  on 
the coastlines of occupied Europe an d  tra in ing  
forces to carry  th em  o u t.2 The aim s of th is  
raiding policy were described in a m em orandum  
to h is  com m anders from L ieutenant-G eneral 
B ern ard  M ontgom ery on 1 Novem ber 1941. 
M ontgomery, th en  in  com m and of B ritish  XII 
Corps in  so u th -east England, s ta ted  that:
In itially , the  o b jec ts  of s u c h  ra id s , in  o rd e r of 
p rio rity , will be;
(a) To b rin g  b a c k  G e rm a n  p riso n e rs , alive if 
possib le .
(b) To o b ta in  in fo rm a tio n  reg a rd in g  th e  n a tu r e  
of th e  enem y’s co as ta l defences.
(c) To in flic t c a su a ltie s  a n d  dam age.
M ontgom ery stressed  the sm all-scale n a tu re  of 
the  proposed raids: “They are, in fact, patro ls -  
reconnoitering  pa tro ls  an d  fighting p a tro ls .” 
L arg e-sca le  e n te rp r is e s  in te n d e d  to c a u se  
significant des tru c tio n  were not p a rt  of th is  
policy: “su ch  raids involve all three services, and 
have certain repercussions, and they are planned 
by GHQ.”3
M onty’s outline raid ing policy w as, in o ther 
words, based  on the resources in men, materiel, 
and  expertise available to the forces in his South­
E ast Com m and, facing the G erm ans across the 
E ng lish  C hannel. His com m and, of course , 
included the C anadian Corps forming in Britain, 
w hich w ould be given access to the  tra in ing  
facilities on the sou th  coast, and to opportunities 
for direct action on the other side of the Channel. 
Always eager to change the defensive m entality  
of too m any  officers an d  m en in h is com m and, 
Monty saw  in a policy of sm all-scale raiding the 
m eans of p reparing  h is  m en for the  realities of 
o f fe n s iv e  a c tio n :  “we live  in  a  t r a in in g  
atm osphere; we now see the  first beginnings of 
a policy w hich will help  to fit o u r Army for 
ba ttle .”4
T ra in in g  for th e  k in d  of e n g a g e m e n ts  
envisioned by M onty necessarily  involved the 
Royal Navy, w hich p resen ted  its own problem s: 
S o u th -E ast C om m and w as already tra in ing  its 
m en  in a s sa u lt  land ing  tech n iq u es  a t HMS 
Northney, b u t lack  of facilities -  above all, of 
landing craft -  m ean t th a t the parties of officers 
a n d  m en se n t to the  Navy base received only 
ab o u t a  week of in struction , and  even th a t  w as 
frequently  in  sub jec ts  w hich would b e tte r have 
been  learned  on dry land  before m aking u se  of 
scarce naval resources.5 Monty’s m em orandum  
on raid ing  policy w as a realistic  b u t lim ited
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The commanding officer o f Viking Force, Major Brian McCool (left), 
along w ith som e unidentified officers o f his unit.
program  for an  active, aggressive role for an  
Army w hich had  received a bloody nose a t the 
h a n d s  of the G erm ans, and  w hich needed time, 
resources, and  a realistic syllabus of tra in ing  to 
h it back  a t its very professional enemy.
Early in 1942, the Acting Com m ander of the 
C anad ian  Corps, L ieu tenan t-G eneral H.D.G. 
C rerar, sh a red  the fru s tra tio n  of h is  B ritish  
colleagues in finding ways of h itting  back  a t the 
G erm ans, and  had  the additional problem  of 
dealing w ith h is own troops’ fru s tra tio n  w ith 
h igher au th o ritie s’ refusal to allow C anad ian  
troops to join other Commonwealth forces in  the 
Middle E a s t.6 A p artia l so lu tion  to the  problem  
could be found in the com m itm ent of C anad ian  
forces to raids on the continent. With h is  chief, 
G eneral A.G.L. M cNaughton, on extended sick 
leave in C anada, C rerar took the initiative and  
wrote Montgomery: I
I am  co n v e rsa n t w ith  th e  re a s o n s  w h ich  have  
led  to th e  c o n tin u e d  re te n tio n  of th e  C a n a d ia n  
C o rp s  in  th e  H om e F o rc e s  a n d  re q u ire  no  
ad d itio n a l a rg u m e n ts  to conv ince  m e th a t  th is  
policy h a s  been  th e  s o u n d  one to  m a in ta in . At 
th e  s a m e  tim e . . .a s  th e  m o n th s  go by  a n d
o p p o rtu n it ie s  fail to  m ateria lize  in  w h ich  th e  
officers a n d  m en  of m y c o m m an d  can  m a tc h  
skill a n d  co u rag e  a g a in s t th e  enem y, th e  m ore 
difficult it will be to m a in ta in  in th em  th e  desired  
k e e n n e ss  a n d  m orale.
I believe th a t  occasions will increasing ly  p re sen t 
th em se lv es  for sm all ra id s  a c ro s s  th e  C h an n e l 
o p p o s i te  th e  A rm y  f r o n t . . . I n  d e f a u l t  o f a 
r e p u t a t i o n  b u i l t  u p  in  b a t t l e  th e  C o rp s  
u n d o u b te d ly  w ould  receive g re a t s t im u lu s  if, in  
th e  n e a r  fu tu re  it su cceed ed  in  m ak in g  a n am e  
for itse lf  for its  ra id in g  ac tiv ities -  a  re p u ta tio n  
w hich , inc iden ta lly , it very definitely  e a rn e d  for 
itse lf in  th e  la s t  w ar.7
To th is  com b ina tion  of ap p ea ls  to po litical 
considerations, m orale-building, an d  history, 
Monty replied the following week in encouraging 
te rm s, rem in d in g  C re ra r of the  c o n tin u in g  
landing-craft shortage, diplomatically reassuring 
him  th a t  “your m en shou ld  be quite first class 
a t raiding,” and  giving him  the green light to ru n  
C anad ian  raid ing  activities from the p o rt of 
Newhaven.8
T hus em boldened, C rerar held d iscussions 
on the  C anad ian  C orps’ fu tu re  role in c ro ss­
C hannel ra ids w ith M ontgom ery and  w ith the
d e p u ty  C hief of th e  Im peria l G enera l S ta ff 
[DCIGS], General Archibald Nye, before m eeting 
w ith the CIGS him self, General Alan Brooke.9 
These conversations led to two m eetings on 6 
M arch 1942 w ith the D irector of C om bined 
O perations [DCO], Lord Louis M ountbatten, the 
DCIGS, and  other high-ranking officers involved 
in  the  growing a rea  of com bined operations. 
C re ra r ’s p re s e n ta tio n  a t  th e  f irs t m eeting , 
m inu ted  by his Brigadier-G eneral (Staff) [BGS], 
Guy Sim onds, w as essen tia lly  a  recap itu la tion  
of h is le tte r to G eneral M ontgomery. The DCO 
was initially reluctant to employ a Canadian force 
b e c a u s e  it  w ou ld  “d i lu te ” th e  ro le  of th e  
C o m m an d o s , w ho w ere , a c c o rd in g  to  a n  
agreem ent with the Com m ander-in-C hief Home 
F o rc e s , to h a v e  a  m o n o p o ly  on  ra id in g . 
M ountbatten was nothing if not acutely tuned  to 
the  political issues  involved in every m ilitary 
organization and  operation, and agreed to m ake 
a n  excep tion  for a p u re ly  C a n a d ian  force. 
Significantly, he also voiced his opinion “th a t very 
sm all raiding parties were useless, an d  th a t  the 
m inim um  streng th  should  no t be less th a n  100 
and  preferably stronger.” M ountbatten th en  laid 
ou t two conditions for the C anad ians to meet:
(a) T h a t am ple tim e sh o u ld  be allowed for p ro p er 
o rgan ization  a n d  tra in in g  -  th is  w as s ta te d  to  be 
six  to e ig h t w eeks.
(b) T h a t th e  e n te rp rise  sh o u ld  be know n  only to 
th e  C o rp s  C om d a n d  B .G .S . a n d  a  lim ited  
n u m b e r  of h is  ow n [ie. M o u n tb a tte n ’s] staff.
G e n e ra l  C r e ra r  r e a d i ly  a g re e d  to  th e s e  
conditions.
At the  second m eeting later th a t afternoon, 
C r e ra r  a n d  S im o n d s  d i s c u s s e d  th e  
a r r a n g e m e n ts  fo r t r a in in g  th e  p ro p o s e d  
C anad ian  com m ando u n it w ith Brigadier J.C . 
Haydon, the C om m ander of the Special Service 
Force (after it was realized th a t the Force’s initials 
were un fo rtu n a te , the  nam e C om m ando w as 
re in s ta te d ) . The d isc u ss io n  en d ed  w ith  a n  
agreem ent to se t u p  a C anad ian  Com m ando of 
ab o u t 200 m en, to begin train ing by the m iddle 
of M arch .10
If C rerar could be considered the fa ther of 
Viking Force, Guy Sim onds was its midwife, and  
he  ca rried  o u t h is  d u ty  w ith c h a ra c te r is tic  
briskness. After further discussion w ith Haydon, 
S im onds visited the  2 n d  C anad ian  Division
headquarters  and passed  on verbal instructions 
from  h is  su p e rio rs  to th e  D ivision’s Acting 
com m ander, B rigadier H am ilton R oberts, and  
his GSO 1, Lieutenant-Colonel Churchill Mann, 
to the effect th a t organization of the force w as to 
begin  im m ediately  a n d  th a t  it sh o u ld  be as 
representative of the 2nd Division as possib le .11
W ithin a fortnight, 267 volunteers from the 
Division were tra in ing  a t Seaford in the  m uddy 
estu a ry  of the  C uckm ere River in Sussex . The 
Vikings’ organization w as essentially  th a t  of a 
B ritish  Com m ando, albeit on a sm aller scale. 
The D etachm ent HQ Section w as headed  by an  
officer w ith the ra n k  of major, an d  com prised 
24 officers and  ORs. A fu rth e r 36 officers and  
m en staffed Intelligence, Signals, an d  Medical 
Sections. The rem ain ing  130 were divided into 
two troops, each  consisting  of five officers and  
60 men. Personal equipm ent reflected the natu re  
of the task s  undertaken  by Commandos: oilskin 
coats and  sou’westers, Mae West lifejackets, wire 
cu tters, b lued  torches, toggle ropes, and  scaling 
la d d e r s .  T he  V ik in g s , lik e  th e i r  B r i t i s h  
exemplars, placed heavy em phasis on firepower: 
in add ition  to the  s ta n d a rd  .303 Lee-Enfields, 
each troop carried four Bren light m achine guns 
and  eight Thom pson sub-m achine guns, as well 
as two an ti- ta n k  rifles an d  a  tw o-inch m ortar. 
Additional su p p o rt could be provided by HQ 
D etachm ent’s three-inch m ortar.12
In sh o rt order, in structo rs  began to winnow 
them  down to the  u n i t’s official com plem ent of 
190 officers a n d  O R s.13 D uring  th is  in itia l 
tra in ing  period, Brigadier R oberts visited the 
troops on 20 M arch a n d  C rerar observed them  
th ree  days la ter.14 From  4 April, personnel from 
the  Special Service Force jo ined  the  Vikings to 
increase the intensity  of their training and  begin 
to tu rn  them  into C om m andos before they w ent 
on th e ir  “killer co u rse” in  S co tlan d .15
D uring  their initial tra in ing  in  Sussex, the 
Vikings h a d  enjoyed a variety  of billets an d  a 
degree of individual freedom  which w ould no t 
have been  tolerated in a regular unit, and  would 
n o t have w orked in a regu lar u n it anyway. The 
m e n  h a d  v o lu n te e re d  fo r a p a r t i c u la r ly  
hazardous, if unknow n, duty, and  were trea ted  
as  if they  w ere ind iv iduals  w ith  a  sen se  of 
responsib ility  along w ith  the ir o ther qualities. 
The un fit were quickly w eeded out as in tended, 
an d  the  survivors of Seaford could p a in t the
S ussex  coast red every n ight if they w anted  to -  
ju s t  as long as they could complete a  fifteen-mile 
rou te  m arch  or spend  eight h o u rs  a day in cliff­
clim bing if th a t w as w hat the ir in s tru c to rs  laid 
on as the day’s en terta inm en t. At Seaford, they 
p rac ticed  w ith the u su a l personal w eapons -  
.303 Lee-Enfield, .38 Webley, .45 Thom pson su b ­
m achine gun, as well as B rens, m orta rs , an d  
the Boys an ti-tank  rifle. In addition, they learned 
to  k ill sw iftly  w ith  F a irb a irn  k n iv e s  a n d  
strang ling  wires -  w hich served double-duty  as 
r a b b i t  s n a re s  to  s u p p le m e n t  th e  a lw ays- 
in a d e q u a te  B r itis h  r a t io n s .  To te s t  th e ir  
susceptib ility  to sea-sickness, the Vikings were 
s e n t  o u t  in  l i t t le  f is h in g  b o a ts  in to  th e  
unpredictable w aters of the English Channel, to 
face the Com m andos’ refinem ent of the medieval 
O rdeal by Water: being throw n overboard w ith 
full packs to tes t the ir ability to survive in the 
w orst conditions.
It was not until 4 April th a t Brigadier Haydon 
could inform  C anad ian  M ilitary H eadquarte rs  
[CMHQ] th a t an  a ssau lt ship would be available 
for Viking Force’s advanced training. On 14 April 
the cam p a t Seaford w as closed and  the Vikings 
were en  rou te  to Scotland, to em bark  on HMS 
Princess Josephine Charlotte a t G reenock on 
15 April.16 If Seaford had  been a grueling ordeal, 
w hat aw aited them  on the m iserably  wet w est
coast of Scotland was infinitely more exhausting. 
The language  of S im o n d s’ m em o on Viking 
Force’s tra in ing  is revealing:
T his tra in in g  will co m p rise  go ing  o u t to se a  in 
A tlantic an d  carrying o u t beach  a ssa u lt exercises 
in  HEBRIDIES [sic] -  a g a in s t local H om e G u a rd  
(who a re  re p u te d  to be  very tough).
F rom  th e s e  m in o r ex erc ises  d e ta c h m e n t ag a in  
goes o u t to  o p en  s e a  a n d  c a rr ie s  o u t a s s a u l t  
lan d in g  exercise ag a in s t one of the com m andoes 
(also very  to u g h ) ...
B efore 15 Apr, 2 C dn  Div d e ta c h m e n t m u s t  be 
fully organized , ru n  in  a n d  very tough .
After describ ing the  rigorous n a tu re  of Viking 
tra in ing  in  detail, S im onds concluded:
T his will be  th e  f irs t d e ta c h m e n t of C a n a d ia n  
T roops to u n d e rtak e  th is  advanced  tra in ing  w ith 
th e  Navy, it is m o st im p o rta n t th a t  it sh o u ld  be:
(a) Well d isc ip lined  a n d  th o ro u g h ly  o rgan ized .
(b) T h o ro u g h ly  tra in e d  in  field c ra ft a n d  u se  of 
w eap o n s by  day  a n d  n igh t.
(c) Very to u g h .17
With the foregoing sen tim ents incorporated into 
the C orps’ Training Instruction  No. 7, the m ain 
responsib ility  for w hipping the Vikings into 
S im onds’ desired  level of toughness p assed  to 
their new ly-appointed CO, M ajor B rian McCool 
of the  Royal Regim ent of C an ad a .18
A bove: Colonel McCool (pointing) training in the 
f ie ld  w ith  Viking Force, April 1942.
R ig h t:  Colonel McCool checks out the a ssa u lt  
c o u rs e  o n  the Isle o f Mull, April 1942.
The survivors of Seaford jo ined McCool on 
board  the Josephine Charlotte. Moored in Loch- 
na-Kiel off the Isle of Mull, the sh ip  w as the 
Vikings’ floating base  while they learned  m ore 
ab o u t the a rt of am phib ious w arfare from the 
Com m andos. W hen the com bined efforts of the 
Navy an d  the Vikings h ad  d rained  the  p u b s  of 
B unessan , the only nearby  town, McCool m ade 
sure  his m en received an  adequate ration of Navy 
rum  to keep their m orale up.
D uring the las t two weeks of April, the  pace 
of tra in in g  in tensified : speed  m arch es  w ith  
weapons and  sixty-pound packs, river crossings, 
leaping from crags into sa n d  p its  fifteen feet 
below, cliff-climbing, and  night manoeuvres. The 
la t te r  exe rc ises  c a rr ie d  th e ir  ow n p e c u lia r  
hazards: if the m en did no t get b ack  to the  
beaches in  tim e to be ferried to the  Joseph ine  
Charlotte, they had  to swim back to the  sh ip  -  
w ith their equipm ent. Very quickly, the  Vikings 
cohered into a u n it w ith a particu larly  s trong  
esprit, an d  a consciousness of the ir own high 
s ta n d a rd s  of m ilitary professionalism , w hich 
w as bo lstered  w hen they reached  the  po in t of 
teaching their Com m ando instructors a few new 
tricks in the  a rts  of cliff-climbing an d  river - 
crossing. Like M ontgom ery, McCool knew  th a t  
m ilitary professionalism  did not depend on sp it 
a n d  p o l is h  o r r ig id  a d h e re n c e  to  K in g ’s 
R egulations, b u t  on  individual responsibility , 
initiative, and  willing team w ork.19
While the  Vikings were carrying o u t their 
advanced  am phib ious operations train ing , the 
C an ad ian  Corps w as evaluating  intelligence 
reports on su itab le targets for fu ture  operations 
opposite S o u th -E ast C om m and’s a rea  on the 
C hannel coast. The m ost favoured objectives, the 
little villages of S tella Plage, M erlim ont Plage, 
and  Q uend Plage, were not heavily defended and 
were su itab le  for a ttack  by sm all com m ando- 
type fo rces.20 So far, th in k in g  a t  C orps HQ 
envisioned raiding as an  essentially sm all-scale 
activity, in  accord w ith  M ontgom ery’s outline 
policy the previous year. By the end  of April, 
however, CMHQ’s raiding policy was undergoing 
s ig n if ic a n t  c h a n g e , b o th  in  s c a le  a n d  in  
objectives.
On 30 April, M ontgom ery visited G eneral 
M c N a u g h to n  a n d  it w a s  a g re e d  t h a t  th e  
C anad ians  shou ld  form the m ain  strik ing  force 
for the  p lanned  raid  on Dieppe. G eneral C rerar 
had  already earm arked  the 2nd Division for this 
k in d  of o p e ra tio n .21 O n th e  sam e  day, 1st 
C anadian Corps HQ issued  Training Instruction 
No. 9, w h ich  a im ed  to  en large th e  scale  of 
com bined operations tra in ing . The docum en t 
served as security  cover for the m ain  object of 
tb e  change -  th e  tra in in g  of the  2 n d  Division’s 
4 th  an d  6 th  B rigades in  com bined ops -  by
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